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Abstract. Susan Haack has recently attempted to discredit religion by showing 
that science is an extended and enhanced version of common sense while 
religion is not. I argue that Haack’s account is misguided not because science is 
not an extended version of common sense, as she says. It is misguided because 
she assumes a very restricted, and thus inadequate, account of common sense. 
After reviewing several more realistic models of common sense, I  conclude 
that common sense is rich enough to allow various kinds of extensions. Just 
as science can be correctly seen as an enhanced version of common sense, so 
also religion.
These last decades, the vast literary output on science and religion 
has concentrated on cutting-edge developments in science, mainly 
in theoretical physics, cognitive science, and evolutionary biology. 
Philosophy of religion in this area has therefore struggled with various 
intricate arguments that are often heavily interlaced with the technical 
language of these sciences. Against this background, a  new kind of 
argument is now emerging, a form of argument that cuts across these 
well-established debates because it refers not to scientific discoveries 
but to the rather mundane idea of common sense. If science is an 
elaborate, extended, or enhanced version of common sense, while 
religion is not, can we conclude that science is better than religion? An 
answer to this question has crucial repercussions in a number of areas 
of philosophy. For instance, it would throw light on the impact of a new 
form of naturalism that is gaining popularity, a form of naturalism less 
associated with positivism and more with pragmatism. It also would 
redraw attention to the philosophical centrality of common sense as 
a possible source of justification.
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Hence it is timely to deal directly with this question, and a good way 
to situate the discussion is to start with Susan Haack’s book Defending 
Science Within Reason, where she articulates this issue very clearly. I will 
first give an overview of her main arguments, especially those that deal 
with religion, and then will proceed with a  sustained analysis of the 
nature of common sense and of its alleged role in justifying science and 
discrediting religion.
I. SuSAN HAACK’S PoSITIoN
Haack’s overall view of scientific inquiry is pragmatic. She explains her 
agenda early on in the book as one of articulating a  healthy middle 
way between two opposed extreme views. She calls these two views 
the old Deferentialism and the New Cynicism. old Deferentialism is 
the position according to which science progresses mainly inductively 
by accumulating true or probably true theories confirmed by evidence. 
This procedure of science, and variations of it, have been clarified by 
logical analysis and defended against a  number of logical paradoxes 
that have been wedged against it these last decades. The overall impact 
of this position is over-optimism, a  kind of scientism. The other 
position, the New Cynicism, is diametrically opposed to this. blatantly 
anti-scientific in tone, this New Cynicism rejects the value of inquiry. 
It endorses relativism, and sometimes even tries to accomplish the 
logically impossible: it tries to talk intelligently about the rejection of 
all rationality. Susan Haack stays clear of both these positions and seeks 
the middle ground because she thinks that both positions not only are 
extreme positions but also suffer from the same deficiency. They both 
suffer from a lack of serious engagement with the world. They both are 
incapable of explaining how through science we can affect the world 
and be affected by the world. What she means here is explained by the 
use of an analogy: the analogy of a crossword puzzle. Scientific practice, 
including evidence and method, is very similar to the entering of words 
in a  crossword puzzle, the entering of the correct words and not just 
any words, entering words that intersect with others already written, 
words that are partially supported by previous entries, and words that 
are themselves partial support for future entries. She calls her middle 
way critical common-sensim, a term she draws from Charles S. Pierce.
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Following the lead of many prominent scientists, she holds that 
science is the long arm of common sense.1 by this, she means that 
scientists are not employing some special method of inquiry unavailable 
to non-scientists. Science is a refinement of everyday thinking. In line 
with this, she adopts a  direct form of realism. She holds that there is 
one correct description of the world, whether we know it or not, and 
that the scientific method is our way of discovering more and more 
details about this correct description. In all this, she remains modest. 
She acknowledges not only the achievements of science, but also ‘the 
pervasive fallibility, the imperfections and flaws, the sheer untidiness, 
of this remarkable but thoroughly human enterprise’ (Haack 2007: 
123). once she establishes in this way the general features of her overall 
approach, she proceeds by discussing various peripheral issues related 
to science, such as the strengths and weaknesses of sociological studies 
of science, and the tension between scientific and literary cultures. In all 
this, her position is similar to that of C. S. Pierce.
As regards the specific area of religion, which is our main interest 
in this paper, she starts by recalling the considerable differences that 
exist between science and religion. They not only have very different 
conceptions of the universe; they even have very different views on what 
constitutes a good explanation. one the one hand, there is science, which 
has developed ways of extending the power of our senses and ways of 
enhancing our faculties of reasoning, remembering, and calculating. 
Science does all this by carefully eschewing appeals to supernatural 
forces and by resorting only to empirical evidence. And on the other 
hand, there is religion, which, according to Haack, is not primarily a kind 
of inquiry at all, but a  creed built around one core idea, the idea that 
‘a  purposeful spiritual being brought the universe into existence, and 
gave human beings a very special place. This spiritual being is concerned 
about how we humans behave and what we believe, and can be influenced 
by our prayers and rituals’ (Haack 2007: 267). Admittedly, theology, as 
a  rational expression of religion, is indeed a  form of inquiry, but, like 
religion, it differs radically from scientific inquiry because it welcomes 
explanations that involve supernatural features. one needs to note at 
this point that, when Haack is expressing this difference between science 
and theology, she does not do so in terms of how these two disciplines 
1 She refers, for instance, to Albert einstein who held that ‘the whole of science is 
nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking’ (einstein 1934-1954: 290).
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function, but in terms of how they relate to everyday empirical inquiry. 
She writes: ‘unlike scientific inquiry, theological inquiry is discontinuous 
with everyday empirical inquiry, both in the kinds of explanations in 
which it traffics and in the kinds of evidential support on which it calls’ 
(Haack 2007: 267). The effect of this discontinuity is evident in the way 
theology, in the course of history, retreated at the same rate as science 
advanced. In Haack’s way of putting it, theology retreated to ‘higher 
ground’. by this, she means that theology kept readjusting its claims and 
diminishing their content until little or nothing factual is now left.
She turns then to address the debate between creationism and 
intelligent design theory. Protagonists on both sides of this debate think 
that there is no compatibility whatsoever between science and theology. 
She does not spend much time with biblical literalists. She turns her 
attention to those scientists who defend religion by allegedly proving that 
evolutionary explanation is incomplete. Such a defence usually refers to 
parts of the organism, such as the eye or the DNA molecule, which are 
considered too internally complex to be producible in stages through 
natural selection. The argument, in short, is that, since evolutionary 
changes, by definition, occur only when they confer some survival 
advantage, and since the internal relations between the parts of such 
complex units are mutually dependent for the efficiency of the whole, 
a change in one of these parts can never result in conferring a survival 
advantage to the organism as a whole. This means that an evolutionary 
explanation cannot be correct for such cases. The parts must change 
all together for any survival advantage to be possible. And postulating 
a synchronized change of a group of variables all together goes against 
the idea of random mutations, which is a basic feature of any evolutionary 
explanation. Haack’s refutation of this argument is interesting. Instead 
of entering into the intricate details of such arguments, as many others 
on both sides of the debate have done, she highlights the virtues of 
scientists. She concedes that there is no clear answer yet, and then 
describes how the occasional gaps in scientific explanation do nothing 
to diminish the determination of scientists, who are perfectly capable of 
admitting that some given question is not answered yet, and that they 
are therefore still working on it – the most natural way to proceed in 
such matters. Theologians are totally different. They can only reiterate: 
‘It was God who did it.’ but this is not an explanation. It is a  mere 
admittance of ignorance. It is just acknowledging that the explanation 
will remain forever inaccessible. For Haack, this attitude is very cheap; 
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it is no substitute for the scientist’s determination to dig further and 
further. She therefore feels perfectly entitled to reiterate her basic insight: 
‘supernatural explanations are as alien to detective work and history or 
to our everyday explanations of spoiled food or delayed buses as they 
are to physics and biology’ (Haack 2007: 279). At this point, a religious 
believer may want to press the objection that religion is not as alien to 
human living as this quotation is implying. religion is as deeply rooted 
in the history of humanity as any of these simple explanations that Haack 
is referring to, and has certainly deeper roots in history than science 
as we know it. To this possible objection, Haack’s answer is typically 
pragmatic. She admits that, because of the ubiquity of religion within 
human society since earliest times, we need to concede that there must 
be something in it. She thinks however that, at this day and age when 
science has progressed so much, people must choose between science 
and religion – and her choice is clear: ‘religion is no less quintessentially 
human an enterprise than science; it is much older, and its roots in our 
psychological makeup perhaps deeper. but its fundamental appeal is to 
the side of the human creature that craves certainty, likes to be elevated 
by mysteries, dislikes disagreeable truths, and clings to the flattering idea 
that we are not just remarkable animals, but the chosen creatures’ (Haack 
2007: 293).
by now, Haack’s overall attitude towards religion should be clear. For 
her, science is a respectable, extended version of common sense while 
religion is not. The solid grounding of science on common sense is what 
science has and what religion lacks as regards justification. undoubtedly, 
the crucial factor in her argument is common sense. but what is common 
sense? Can it really offer Haack the leverage she needs to sideline religion?
II. CommoN SeNSe
As a first approximation, we can start with the idea that common sense 
is the set of rational features common to all human beings. The basic 
idea behind this preliminary definition is that the word ‘sense’ within 
the expression ‘common sense’ is associated not with the concept of 
perception but with the concept of reasonability. The principles of 
common sense understood in this way can be manifested in the way 
people reason things out in normal circumstances. To make a list of these 
principles in detail is not at all straightforward. Consequently, although 
many people agree that it is perfectly correct to talk about common 
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sense and even that the expression ‘common sense’ refers to something, 
not many would be capable of articulating even the major principles it 
consists in. Some prominent philosophers have had a  go at this task, 
because they were motivated by the conviction that a lot of what we do in 
our intellectual activity depends on common sense. The result however 
has never been a complete list of principles. Aristotle and Thomas reid, 
for instance, assumed the existence of common understanding, and 
they even considered it something like a platform on which elaborate 
philosophical arguments can be built.2 They went so far as to consider 
it a  foundational source from which conclusions can be drawn about 
what can be said and what cannot be said, what can be deduced and 
what cannot be deduced. In the words of Thomas reid, philosophy 
‘has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out 
of them and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, 
its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots’ (reid 1983: 7). 
These philosophers did all this however without ever coming close to 
producing a full list of constitutive principles of common sense. Some 
may think that this verges on the irresponsible. How can a philosophy 
be sound if it is based on common sense when the nature of common 
sense is not clarified first? Although this is an important question, it is 
not directly related to my aims in this paper. Suffice it to say that I do not 
think there is any major fault here. The basic assumption is simple. These 
philosophers, and others like them, assume that common sense includes 
foundational principles that are universally held and are consequently 
inviolable and unavoidable. Denying these principles would be self-
contradictory, either because these principles can only be denied in 
artificially construed contexts, far from any real life situation, or because 
these principles are always being assumed tacitly in the very process of 
denying them.3
2 When we are discussing Aristotle, the expression ‘common sense’ can lead to 
ambiguity. He often uses the expression ‘common sense’ to refer to that mental faculty 
that brings to unity what is perceived in different ways by the different senses. What 
we nowadays refer to by ‘common sense’ is not this. For us, ‘common sense’ refers to 
those aspects of rationality that are common to all, for instance the principle of non-
contradiction. Having said this, however, it is good to recall that this relatively modern 
use of the expression ‘common sense’ is also present in Aristotle, even though he does 
not refer to it by that expression.
3 useful explorations of the interface between common sense and science include: 
Gavin 1984, musgrave 1993, and rescher 2005. For a  more general epistemological 
account, see moore 1959, Chisholm 1977, Chisholm 1982, and lemos 2004.
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For the argument I am focusing on in this paper, the main interest 
is the understanding of common sense by contemporary philosophers 
like Susan Haack. The way she appeals to common sense is typical of 
the philosophical tradition she belongs to, namely pragmatism. A typical 
pragmatist like Charles Sanders Peirce assumes that ‘there are indubitable 
beliefs which vary a  little and but a  little under varying circumstances 
and in distant ages; that they partake of the nature of instincts [...] they 
are very vague indeed (such as, that fire burns)’ (Peirce 1931-1958: 498). 
Peirce adds that these vague beliefs, which are constitutive of common 
sense, ‘have the same sort of basis as scientific results have. That is to 
say, they rest on experience – on the total everyday experience of many 
generations of multitudinous populations [...] all science, without being 
aware of it, virtually supposes the truth of the vague results of uncontrolled 
thought upon such experiences’ (Peirce 1931-1958: 522).4 The basic idea 
here is that human beings are all endowed with the elements of common 
sense and that they express these by vague propositions like ‘fire burns’. 
Through the use of sophisticated scientific methods, such propositions 
are not falsified but refined. They are stripped of their vagueness, and 
thereby clarified. For Peirce and his followers, therefore, the continuity 
between common sense and science is clear and fundamental. And 
Haack is building her argument precisely on this continuity. For her, 
science is an enhanced version of common sense as described by Peirce.5
but now we have to face the crucial issue. Is common sense correctly 
exemplified by the belief that fire burns? In other words, is common sense 
limited to explanation of physical effects in terms of physical causes? Can 
people appeal to common sense when dealing with issues that go beyond 
the empirically verifiable? These questions are very important for Haack. 
She is arguing that there is continuity between science and common 
sense, and that this continuity justifies science as a legitimate mode of 
intellectual activity. Science is acceptable, she claims, because it is the 
long arm of common sense. Anyone who attempts to discredit science 
4 For further insight into Peirce’s views, see his two papers ‘Pragmaticism and Critical 
Common-Sensism’; and ‘Consequences of Critical Common-Sensism’ (both in Peirce 
1931-1958, vol, 5). I discuss these issues in Caruana 2000, chapter 8.
5 It is good to indicate here that Haack does not follow Peirce all the way. She seems 
to think that if one is a  pragmatist one is obliged to be a  religious unbeliever. Peirce 
himself, however, defended religious belief in his own way. The climax of his philosophy 
of religion is probably his 1908 paper ‘A Neglected Argument for the reality of God’ 
(Peirce 1931-1958, vol. 6).
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will be discrediting common sense, and thereby sliding into irrationality. 
but could it be that common sense is a broader platform than she thinks? 
If it is, the justification she thinks is reserved only for science may in fact 
be available also for other modes of intellectual activity.
So my main contention with Haack should now be clear. I want to 
argue first that common sense is broader than instrumental reasoning, 
and secondly that, because of this, religion is justified as an enhanced 
version of common sense just like science.
III. mulTIDImeNSIoNAl CommoN SeNSe
The first step is to ask: how can common sense be broader than 
instrumental reasoning? To explore some possibilities, let us start with 
an example. Consider Aristotle’s two famous claims: that all people desire 
to know, and that all people are driven by wonder. Such claims indicate 
that, for Aristotle, a person who does not desire to know, or who is not 
driven by wonder, would be lacking in something that is fundamental, 
lacking in something that is common to all humans. of course, there are 
many features that humans share in common, such as having one heart 
and two lungs. but the features Aristotle is referring to in this context are 
not biological features; they are mental. A person who does not desire to 
know or who is not driven by wonder would be lacking in what pertains 
to the rational or to the conceptual dimension of being human in just 
the same way as an individual whose reasoning violates the principle of 
non-contradiction. Consequently, if I am reading Aristotle correctly, we 
have here an indication that there is more to common sense, understood 
as common rationality, than just principles that are embedded within 
explanation in terms of cause and effect.6
To explore this further, consider the set of concepts indispensable for 
inter-personal relations. These concepts are associated directly with the 
conceiving of other humans as persons: they are associated directly with 
the conceiving of others as irreducible units that are bearers of a specific 
6 I pick Aristotle as an example because of his particular affinity with today’s scientific 
attitudes, an affinity that can best be seen in his method. He does not begin with being 
sceptical. He trusts our perceptual and cognitive faculties, and assumes that they put us 
in direct contact with reality. Starting from experience, he reflects deeply on any puzzles 
that such experience presents. And yet he does not limit his reflection to any one area 
of human activity. For him, what humans do by nature is broader than the science of 
production (see Metaphysica, 982b: 11-27).
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group of predicates, predicates associated with love, hate, sympathy, 
resentment, trust, suspicion, forgiveness, revenge, honesty, hypocrisy, and 
with other concepts like these. These concepts can function only once the 
concept of person, as a basic category, is in place. Can we consider this 
set of concepts dispensable? We cannot. Anyone who tries to live without 
them would simply drift away from the community that makes meaning 
possible. moreover, any attempt to discredit the centrality of these concepts 
involves an instance of using them – because the very discrediting has to be 
carried out within a community of persons. language itself is a communal 
activity. It is therefore clear that, if common sense is taken to be the set 
of all that is universally held and that is inviolable and unavoidable, it 
includes more than just the principles involved in instrumental reasoning 
in terms of cause and effect. Haack’s argument is one-sided because she 
emphasizes only one dimension of common sense, and thinks that that is 
all there is to say about common sense.
my second step now is to show that just as science is an enhanced 
version of the instrumental dimension of common sense (which is 
just one of the many dimensions of common sense) so also religion is 
an enhanced version of another dimension of common sense, more 
specifically an enhanced version of the dimension that involves concepts 
associated with interpersonal relations. my argument here starts with 
a  couple of observations concerning Haack’s reasoning. What is it 
that convinces pragmatic philosophers like Haack that science can 
legitimately be called an enhanced version of common sense? First, 
I would guess, such people are impressed by the fact that the logical form 
of explanation within science is also found in common sense. It does 
not require much thought and self-reflection to realise that common 
sense involves observation, inductive generalizations (most of which are 
tentative), falsifiability tests, inference to the best explanation, and so on. 
All these features constitute the engine of sophisticated scientific research. 
moreover, philosophers like Haack are also impressed by the fact that 
science generates the building of instruments that enlarge the range of 
observation, increase the speed of seeing correlations, and enhance other 
such operations. Such enhancement is essentially equivalent to enlarging 
the range of the simple explanations of everyday life.
Now consider religion. The list of basic concepts at work within 
a religious way of life includes not only the central concept of maximal 
greatness or infinite perfection, which is usually expressed by the word 
‘God’. It includes also concepts related to acting rightly and acting wrongly, 
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to attributing praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, to honesty and 
hypocrisy, to love and hate, to consolation and desolation, to wonder and 
fear – all these basic concepts are the same in essence as those constituting 
the dimension of common sense associated with inter-personal relations. 
We may even add here that in some religious traditions, most notably in 
Christianity, even the concept of maximal greatness is associated with 
inter-personal relations. And this fact explains why even children can 
already have a basic sense of religion, a very simple but genuine sense 
of religion, from an early age. moreover, religion is expressed through 
practices and rituals, both personal and communal, which enlarge or 
deepen the understanding of the interpersonal relations of everyday 
life. The sense of personal commitment and fidelity is highlighted, 
community ideals of goodness and beauty are deepened, global fraternity 
and personal self-giving are enhanced, ideals concerning loyalty and 
self-sacrifice are purified.
So the parallelism should now be noticeable. What justifies the idea 
that science is an enhanced version of common sense justifies also the 
idea that religion is, in its own way, an enhanced version of common 
sense as well. Common sense is rich enough to allow various genuine 
extended and enhanced versions of it. Science enhances common sense 
in one direction while religion enhances common sense in another 
direction. Science and religion are not competing extensions of common 
sense, but extensions of different dimensions of common sense. Science 
is an extension of the instrumental and explanatory dimension. religion 
is an extension of the dimension of common sense that is associated with 
inter-personal relations.
one might object here that I am naïvely taking religion to be a force 
for the good. I seem to be arguing that religion enhances inter-personal 
relations in the sense of making them better. but if we think of the adverse 
effects religion has had on civilization in the course of history, we will 
never be tempted to see it as enhancement at all. This objection introduces 
an important point. religion emerges within human culture in various 
ways, and not all these ways are positive. but this fact does nothing 
to undermine the main line of argument. Concepts associated with 
interpersonal-relations come in various kinds. If there is love, there is also 
hate; if there is honesty, there is also hypocrisy. religion can enhance both 
the good ways we relate to each other and also the bad ways. And, within 
the major religions, this ambivalence is well recognized. It is dealt with 
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by self-corrective mechanisms inscribed within their moral traditions. 
Notice that we can argue in a parallel fashion about science. Although 
it is agreed that science is an enhanced version of common sense, as 
defended by Haack, we cannot thereby deduce that science has always 
been a force for the good. We cannot thereby argue that science has been, 
and will always be, beneficial for genuine human flourishing. being based 
on common sense is no guarantee that things cannot go wrong.
Some may want to object that my line of argument has stretched 
Haack’s understanding of common sense beyond all recognition. She 
is talking about a set of common rules for inquiry, while I am talking 
about the set of concepts and presuppositions that are necessary for what 
might be called successful navigation through life. I concede that this is 
a legitimate observation, but I add that the distinction between the two 
accounts is not a weakness in my overall argument. The two accounts are 
intimately related. Since I am ready to accept that navigation through life, 
as understood here, is indeed helped by correct strategies of inquiry, my 
understanding of common sense is broader than Haack’s and includes 
it. What justifies the broader view is the fact that human beings are not 
characterised only by skills regarding inquiry. They are characterised also 
by other species-specific dimensions of their activity, including all that is 
semantic, symbolic, personal, and interpersonal. These dimensions are 
as foundational a fact of human natural history as the fact that humans 
reason things out deductively and inductively, and have twenty-three 
pairs of chromosomes.
In highlighting this fact, I am in fact presenting an argument that is 
in line with an important trend in current biological thinking, a trend 
associated with the idea of the extended phenotype. The expression 
‘extended phenotype’ is used by those who claim that considering an 
organism solely in terms of its constitutive microphysical and chemical 
processes is seriously limited. The basic proposal is that the phenotype 
of an organism, in other words its characteristic outward, physical 
appearance as distinct from its genetic makeup, is not limited to 
biological processes only; it should include also all the effects that that 
genetic makeup has on the environment. In other words, we need to 
accept that the specificity of any organism, when correctly understood, 
extends way beyond the individual microstructure and even beyond its 
surface features. For instance, we need to realise that the way beavers 
build their nest is as much part of the nature of beavers as the colour 
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of their fur, the flatness of their tail, and the structure of their DNA.7 
my broad view of common sense is similar to this. It is an extension of 
Haack’s view just as the idea of the extended phenotype is an extension of 
the previous limited view of phenotype. In other words, I am urging that, 
to obtain a correct view of the specific rational nature of human beings, 
we cannot limit our considerations to how humans deal with simple 
inquiry of the form ‘Why P?’. We need to broaden our range of vision, as 
it were, and acknowledge also how humans have an important species-
specific side to their nature that arises from their complex symbolic way 
of relating interpersonally, from their appreciation of time, value, and 
personal commitment, and from the way in which they do not just exist 
but are infinitely interested in existing (Kierkegaard 1992: 302).
So to conclude, the main question addressed to Haack was this: can 
common sense be an efficient tool to justify science and discredit religion? 
I argued that the answer is no. The answer is no not because there is no 
such thing as common sense, and not because Haack has given a wrong 
characterisation of common sense. The answer is no basically because 
common sense is much broader than what Haack thinks it is. of course, 
more work needs to be done. Perhaps there are objections I  have not 
considered. Perhaps some would say that, as regards this issue, Haack’s 
work is not a good place to start. And perhaps there is some argument 
that shows that religious activity is not in fact related to interpersonal 
relations after all. Given the strength of the pragmatist tradition, and the 
impressive philosophical skills of many within that tradition, it seems 
reasonable to predict that my argument will not convince everyone. Still, 
it remains to be seen why not. At the very least, I hope to have shown that 
those who adopt Haack’s nuanced naturalistic approach to religion run 
the risk of ending up with a severely skewed view of what common sense 
can and cannot support.
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